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1. Introduction
The question of how we should divide up, or individuate, sensory modalities has a 
long history, with little consensus as how it should be resolved.  While it is often 1
claimed that humans have just five senses — a view that dates back to Aristotle (350 BC) 
—  this conventional view has come under increasing pressure from recent scientific 
advances which identify a host of additional internal and external ‘senses’. These 
include, but are not limited to
(i) thermoreception (temperature)
(ii) haptic touch (as distinct from tactual touch)
(iii) texture (as distinct from tactual pressure)
(iv) proprioception (bodily position)
(v) kinaesthesis (bodily movement)
(vi) equilibrioception (balance and acceleration)
(vii) agency (self-generated action)
(viii) trigeminal sensations (‘hot’ and ‘cool’ flavours)
(ix) nociception (as distinct from the sensation of pain)
 For an overview, see Matthen (2015).1
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not to mention a host of possible and actual non-human senses.  Moreover, a 2
burgeoning scientific and philosophical literature on multisensory perception and 
cross-modal effects presupposes the existence of a distinction between unimodal sensory 
modalities  —  visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, and so on.  —  and multisensory 
experience; e.g. flavour perception (Smith 2016). The precise grounds for this distinction, 
however, are rarely spelled out, and attempts to elucidate it often end up sidestepping 
the question (Fulkerson 2014a) or in a form of proof by exhaustion (Macpherson 2011, 
2015), neither of which is entirely satisfying.3
The individuation problem is significant for both the conceptual and metaphysical 
basis of perception, since we perceive the world in multiple ways — e.g. through vision 
and touch — each with a distinctive mode of presentation or phenomenal character. Yet 
the world does not appear to us to be divided between the senses, but as a complex 
and integrated whole. The ‘chemical senses’ of taste, smell and trigeminal sensation 
present a particularly interesting test case for theories of sensory individuation due to 
the inherently multisensory nature of flavour perception (Auvray and Spence 2008). 
Indeed, some theorists (Rozin 1982; Smith 2015) have claimed that humans have not 
one, but two olfactory senses: (1) orthonasal olfaction, in which odorants are inhaled via 
the nose in what English speakers generally refer to as ‘smell’; and (2)  retronasal 
olfaction, in which odorants are exhaled from the back of the throat, typically when 
chewing or swallowing food and drink. This enables different theories of sensory 
individuation to be evaluated against a realistic test case — namely, olfaction — along 
with olfaction’s relation to other senses.
In this paper, I aim to do two things. First, I evaluate how traditional philosophical 
criteria for individuating sensory modalities (§2) fare with respect to olfaction. I argue 
that these are at best inconclusive, since they cannot settle the question without further 
 See Wilson and Macpherson (2018) for a representative summary.2
 I discuss these views further in §4.3.3
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potentially question-begging assumptions, and at worst contradictory, and so should 
be rejected (§3). I use this to motivate an alternative broadly Gibsonian account of 
sensory individuation that highlights the ambiguity between two distinct notions of a 
sense-modality: a physiological sensory channel and an experiential modality (§4). I argue 
that the resulting ‘dual-concept’ framework facilitates a more useful and accurate 
characterisation of human sensory architecture than competing accounts. This in turn 
enables us to diagnose much of the philosophical disagreement in this area as the result 
of a failure to recognise that there are two distinct and mutually complementary 
concepts of a sense-modality at play here, rather than, as has traditionally been 
assumed, only one. The resulting framework supports the conclusion that while 
humans have two physiological pathways for olfaction, we only have one sense of 
smell, along with a multimodal flavour sense that we call ‘taste’ (§5).
2. The Individuation Problem
The question of how to individuate the senses may itself be subdivided into the 
following questions:4
Type-individuation question (TYPE): Upon what grounds should we consider two 
occurrences of a sense-modality to be of different modality types (visual, 
auditory, tactual, etc.)?
Token-individuation question (TOKEN): Upon what grounds should we consider 
putative occurrences of a sense-modality to be numerically distinct?5
While TYPE has received considerably more attention in the philosophical literature 
than TOKEN, the two questions are necessary interrelated since without knowing how 
 Cf. Macpherson (2011, p. 14), who divides the problem slightly differently.4
 Alternatively, one can formulate these questions in terms of token experiences falling under 5
sensory types. For an account along these lines, see O’Callaghan (2015).
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to identify candidate ‘token’ senses, we cannot ask whether they are of different types, 
and two such putative ‘tokens’ can only be identical if they are of the same type.  TYPE 6
and TOKEN are thus mutually dependent, though it is not obvious which, if either, has 
explanatory priority.
According to the traditional Aristotelian view of the senses, smell, or olfaction,  is 7
one of five external or exteroceptive senses, consisting of a single type and token 
modality. We can summarise this view as follows:
(A) Humans have a single token olfactory modality
In an influential paper, however, the psychologist Paul Rozin observes that “olfaction is 
a dual sense: it functions both for sensing objects in the outside world and for objects in 
the mouth” (1982, p.  397; my emphasis). Indeed, Rozin goes so far as to claim that 
“[t]he olfactory system is the only major sense modality that is frequently confused 
with another sense modality (taste)” (ibid.) — a claim echoed by Spence, Auvray and 
Smith (2014), and Smith (2015, p. 323).
While it is unclear precisely how to interpret Rozin’s claim, some psychologists 
and philosophers who are aware of the distinction have taken this to mean that 
humans have not one, but two senses of smell, these corresponding to the operation of 
the orthonasal and retronasal olfactory pathways. As stated, however, Rozin’s claim is 
ambiguous between (at least) three different interpretations:
 For consistency with the literature, I follow Macpherson’s (2011) terminology, though 6
Macpherson’s use of the term ‘token’ is somewhat misleading since it refers not to particular 
spatiotemporally located instances of a given modality type, but to what are properly called its 
occurrences in a given kind of organism (cf. §§2.1–2.2). For present purposes, ‘token’ and 
‘instance’ should be taken to refer to occurrences, though nothing in my argument turns upon 
this point. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.
 To avoid begging the question, I will use the term ‘olfaction’ and ‘olfactory’ in preference to 7
‘smell’, where the former are taken to be neutral as to whether we have one or two olfactory 
senses (see §4.1).
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Rtype Humans have two token olfactory modalities of different modality types
Rtoken Humans have two token olfactory modalities of the same modality type
Rrole Humans have a single token olfactory modality that performs two 
different functional roles
In order to differentiate Rozin’s claim from (A), we must establish which, if any, of the 
above interpretations is correct.
First, however, it will be helpful to set out some criteria that have been offered in 
response to the type- and token-individuation questions, along with some of the 
difficulties that accompany them (§§2.1–2.2). I then apply these criteria to the case of 
olfaction (§3) before presenting an alternative account (§4).
2.1. Type-Individuation
Following Grice (1962), Macpherson (2011) identifies four main criteria that have 
traditionally been used, either individually or in combination, to individuate sense-
modality types. These are:
(I) Proximal stimulus: the kinds of physical objects and/or properties that are 
directly detectable by each sense; e.g. light (or colour) in the case of vision, 
sound (or timbre) in audition, the various chemical properties associated with 
odours and tastes, and so on.
(II) Sense-organ: the physical organ or sensory system used to detect sensory 
stimuli; e.g. the eyes (or visual system) for vision, the ears (or auditory system) 
for audition, the nose (or olfactory system) for olfaction, and so on.
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(III) Phenomenal character: the subjective quality  that is characteristic of perceptual 8
experiences in the relevant modality.
(IV) Representational content: the objects and/or properties that experiences in the 
relevant modality represent.
Note that the above criteria are neither wholly independent nor exhaustive.  The 9
sense-organ criterion, for example, presupposes an individuation of sensory organs 
that might be thought dependent upon the proximal stimuli that are detected by those 
organs, i.e. (I). Similarly, according to intentionalist views of perception, e.g. Byrne 
(2001), an experience’s phenomenal character supervenes upon or is identical to its 
representational content, in which case (III) and (IV) will covary. Moreover, an 
experience’s representational content might be thought to depend upon the kinds of 
proximal or distal stimuli that are detected, as per (I) and (II). Finally, advocates of 
Naïve Realism and relationalism typically deny that perceptual experiences have 
representational contents (e.g. Campbell 2002; Martin 2002; Brewer 2006, 2011), in 
which case (IV) may be rejected in favour of phenomenal character being partly 
constituted by external particulars, and so dependent upon the proximal and/or distal 
objects of perception. Even so, such theories must explain why the phenomenal 
character of, for example, an object’s shape differs according to whether it is 
experienced via vision or touch.
In order to provide a comprehensive theory of sensory individuation, one must 
specify a criterion, or set of criteria, for individuating the senses, including the various 
‘hidden’ senses mentioned above, rather than separate criteria for each. This creates a 
 I will use ‘phenomenal character’ in preference to ‘qualia’ throughout since the latter is 8
ambiguous between the qualitative character of experience — “what it’s like” (Nagel 1974) — 
and a non-representational mental object, i.e. a sense-datum (cf. Block 1996), or quality thereof.
 Other possible criteria include the spatiotemporal characteristics of the relevant modality, and 9
how information is processed and/or integrated (see §4.1).
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potential difficulty for single-criterion accounts since each of the Aristotelian external 
senses is capable of detecting a diverse range of objects and properties. Touch, for 
example, may be further divided into sub-modalities for pressure, texture, shape, 
temperature, and pain, each of which has dedicated receptors in the skin (Fulkerson 
2014b). However, a comparable subdivision of vision into sub-modalities for colour, 
shape, texture, and depth seems intuitively incorrect. Multi-criteria approaches, on the 
other hand, face the problem of precisely which combination of criteria to adopt, and 
how to resolve conflicts between them. Yet further views appeal to conventional usage 
(Nudds 2011; Richardson 2013), pragmatic or contextual considerations (Fulkerson 
2014a), or statistical analysis (Macpherson 2015) to try and resolve these issues.  Since 10
space considerations preclude an exhaustive evaluation of each of these positions, I 
will confine myself to a couple of illustrative examples.
Grice (1962) imagines a hypothetical “Martian” who possesses two pairs of visual 
organs which, despite being physiologically identical, generate experiences with quite 
different phenomenal characters.  Were we to take the Martian’s phenomenological 11
reports at face value, we might say that they have not one, but two distinct visual 
senses, where this can be construed as either (1)  two different modality types, or 
(2)  two occurrences, or ‘tokens’, of a single type. These options are analogous to the 
corresponding interpretations of Rozin’s claim, Rtype and Rtoken, respectively. Which, if 
either, is correct, and how such cases can in principle be decided will depend upon the 
type- and token-individuation criteria that one adopts. Either way, Grice argues that 
such examples show that the sense-organ criteria alone is insufficient to individuate 
modality types, since one must also take phenomenal character into account.
 See §4.3 for discussion.10
 Whether such a scenario is genuinely conceivable may depend upon one’s view of the mind–11
body problem (cf. Chalmers 1996).
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Lest this problem be thought to be confined to the realms of science-fiction, 
dolichopteryx longipes, the brownsnout spookfish, has eyes that are divided into distinct 
upper and lower parts. The upper eye-pair contains lenses that focus light onto the 
creature’s retinas in the standard way. The lower eye-pair, however, contain mirrored 
surfaces that reflect light onto a separate pair of retinas, thus maximising the light 
collected from the darker waters below (Wagner, Douglas, Frank, Roberts and 
Partridge 2009). As in Grice’s hypothetical example, whether this counts as one or two 
type or token visual senses will depend, among other things, upon: (a) whether the 
spookfish’s visual organs are regarded as a single ‘pair’ of dual-function eyes, or 
separate upper and lower eye-pairs; (b) whether the representational content and/or 
phenomenal character of the resulting experiences differ markedly (§3.1.3); and 
(c) whether the relevant sensory systems are spatially and phenomenally continuous 
with one another (§3.2.1–2). While we have no way of assessing the visual experiences 
of brownsnout spookfish, assuming they have any, a careful consideration of human 
olfaction shows that we ourselves might be somewhat analogous with respect to the 
sense of smell (§3).
2.2. Token-Individuation
In relation to the individuation of token sense-modalities, there is less of an established 
literature to go on. Indeed, Martians and spookfish notwithstanding, many find the 
idea of a creature that has multiple instances or occurrences of the same modality-type 
difficult to grasp, or somewhat uncanny.  In addition to the type-individuation criteria 12
listed above, however, plausible token-individuation criteria include:
(i) Spatial contiguity: whether experiences present a single spatially unified field, 
as per human vision and arguably audition (see Wilson ms), or distinct spatial 
regions.
 I suggest a possible reason for this in §4.2.12
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(ii) Phenomenal continuity: whether there is a smooth continuum of potential 
percepts, suggesting a single token modality, or an abrupt change in 
phenomenal character, as with Grice’s Martian, suggesting independent 
tokens.
(iii) Counterfactual dependency: whether the loss or impairment of one putative 
token modality would, were this physiologically possible, qualitatively affect 
the phenomenal character of the other putative token modality.
(iv) Intersubstitutability: whether loss or impairment of one putative token 
modality would affect the kinds of discriminations, judgements or tasks that 
the organism is capable of carrying out.
Again, the above criteria are neither uncontroversial nor exhaustive. They do, 
however, receive support from a consideration of cases. Photopic (i.e. normal light) and 
scotopic (i.e. low-light) vision in humans are generally considered to constitute a single 
token-modality largely due to their spatial and phenomenal continuity, i.e. (i) and (ii) 
above. Indeed, were one unaware that these forms of vision employed distinct 
receptors on the retina, one might consider the difference between them merely a 
matter of degree, e.g. in brightness and colour saturation, rather than a difference in 
kind. Similarly, binocular vision is a result of both eyes working together to form a 
single contiguous field of view rather than independent left and right hemi-fields, as is 
conceivably the case in creatures whose eyes are capable of viewing independent 
regions of objective space. Furthermore, the loss or impairment of one eye results in a 
reduction in depth information that affects the phenomenal character of the resulting 
visual experience, suggesting a unified token modality, as per (iii). In such cases, 
however, the kinds of visual discriminations and tasks that the organism is able to make 
or perform remain largely unchanged, as per (iv), despite the decrease in spatial 
accuracy due to the reduction in depth information. This contrasts with the case of the 
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spookfish described above, whose upper and lower eye-pairs appear to have evolved 
distinctive functions such that the loss of the upper or lower eye-pair would 
presumably disrupt its behaviour more profoundly than the loss of one eye does in 
humans. The above considerations suggest that for us, at least, both eyes form part of a 
single token visual sense, rather than two distinct tokens.
3. Orthonasal and Retronasal Olfaction
Having set out some standard criteria for sensory individuation, I now examine how 
these fare in the case of olfaction. As noted above, orthonasal olfaction occurs when air 
containing one or more odorants,  i.e. chemical substances to which we have olfactory 13
sensitivity, are taken in through the nose, typically by breathing or sniffing. These are 
propelled upwards into the nasal cavity where they pass over the olfactory epithelium, a 
network of receptors that is capable of detecting upwards of 400 distinct chemical 
signatures (Olender et al. 2012). The nerves extending from these receptors connect via 
the olfactory bulb to the pyriform cortex, which in turn projects into the amygdala, 
hippocampus, thalamus, entorhinal cortex,  orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and other 14
brain areas. Orthonasally-sensed odorants (or the resulting sensations) are typically 
experienced as being located in or around the nose, though may also be ‘referred’ to an 
external location —  a nearby odour source, for example —  on the basis of vision or 
touch.15
Retronasal olfaction —  a term that did not enter into scientific usage until 1984 
(Bartoshuk, Sims, Colquhoun and Snyder 2019) — occurs when pulses of odorant are 
 As the terms ‘odour’ and ‘smell’ are ambiguous between the objective stimuli for olfaction 13
and the phenomenal character of the resulting experiences, I will use the term ‘odorant’ to refer 
to olfactory stimuli, reserving ‘smell’ for the experiential modality (§4).
 Along with other elements of the limbic system, the entorhinal cortex also receives direct 14
projections from the olfactory bulb, thus explaining olfaction’s unique influence upon emotion, 
memory and behaviour (Jacob 2002, p. 304).
 For discussion of olfaction as a form of exteroception, see Richardson (2011).15
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propelled upwards via the throat from the back of the nasal cavity (hence: ‘retro’), 
typically as a result of chewing or swallowing. Odorants then pass over the olfactory 
epithelium before being exhaled via the nose. In contrast to orthonasal olfaction, 
retronasally-sensed odorants (or the resulting sensations) are typically experienced as 
located in the mouth or back of the throat due to what is known as oral referral (Spence, 
Auvray and Smith 2014). The perceived location of the odour, or odour source, thus 
differs from the location of the olfactory detectors in a way that is consistent with 
retronasal olfaction’s distinctive role in flavour perception.
While the existence of two distinct olfactory pathways might be considered prima 
facie evidence for Rtype, this does not yet establish the importance of this distinction for 
the individuation of olfactory modalities. To do that we must apply the type- and 
token-individuation criteria set out in §2, as discussed below.
3.1. Type-Individuation Criteria
3.1.1.Proximal Stimulus
The proximal stimuli for olfaction are the chemical compounds and/or their properties 
that are detectable via the olfactory epithelium. While philosophical accounts of 
olfaction differ on precisely what we perceive via olfaction,  there is no evidence that 16
we can detect different kinds of odorants via the orthonasal and retronasal pathways. 
Indeed, while odorants can undergo physical changes in the nose and throat due to 
moisture, heat and other physical effects, it would be surprising if the two pathways 
were sensitive to different proximal stimuli given that both share the same olfactory 
receptors (though this does not rule out differences in the typical distal objects of 
olfaction). Rather, what differs between the two is the route by which odorants reach 
the olfactory epithelium, i.e. through the nose or via the back of the throat. The 
 Recent accounts of odours include object-based views (cf. Batty 2014), property-based views 16
(Lycan 2014), stuffs (Mizrahi 2013), and olfactibilia (Richardson 2018).
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proximal stimulus criterion alone, then, would suggest that there is only one olfactory 
modality type.
3.1.2.Sense-Organ
The second type-individuation criterion is less straightforward to evaluate. Each of the 
traditional five senses has a dedicated organ — or pair of organs in the case of hearing 
and sight — with the nose being the obvious locus of olfaction. It is less clear, however, 
whether the sense-organ for retronasal olfaction should be extended to include the 
mouth and/or those parts of the brain and nervous system that transmit and process 
olfactory stimuli.
Here, different precisifications of the sense-organ criterion deliver different results. 
On a coarse-grained version of the criterion, the entire olfactory system including nose, 
mouth and the relevant brain regions might be considered to constitute a single ‘sense-
organ’. This would render orthonasal and retronasal olfaction sub-modalities of a 
single modality-type in much the same way as texture, pressure and temperature 
might be considered sub-modalities of touch (§2). Similarly, a view that individuated 
sense-organs in terms of sensory receptors alone would classify orthonasal and 
retronasal olfaction as a single modality on the basis that both employ the same 
receptors in the olfactory epithelium.  On a fine-grained version of the sense-organ 17
criterion, however, only the retronasal pathway would extend to the mouth and throat, 
with the orthonasal pathway limited to the nose and nasal cavity. This would suggest 
the existence of two distinct olfactory senses with overlapping mechanisms. While this 
kind of sharing of sensory mechanisms might seem unusual, there seems to be no 
reason to rule it out in principle. After all, human sensory organs might have evolved 
to employ multiple combining or overlapping parts rather than dedicated external 
 Alternatively, we could abandon the traditional labels and classify the chemical senses as a 17
single integrated modality, as per the dominant view of touch (cf. Fulkerson 2014b).
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and/or internal organs, without this requiring that the resulting ‘senses’ formed a 
single modality-type.
The picture becomes increasingly complex when we consider olfactory neural 
architecture. Perhaps unsurprisingly given that we can detect the difference between 
them, orthonasal and retronasal olfaction activate many, but not all, of the same brain 
regions. Retronasal olfaction differentially activates brain areas that are more typically 
associated with gustation rather than smell, though there is also a large degree of 
overlap (Small, Voss, Mak, Simmons, Parrish and Gitelman 2004; Small, Gerber, Mak 
and Hummel 2005). If the sense-organ criterion extends to include those elements of 
the nervous system and brain that are dedicated to sensory processing, then the 
evidence for this kind of differentiation at a relatively early stage of sensory processing 
might support a distinction in modality-type. Indeed, psychologists have posited the 
existence of a dedicated “flavour network” in the brain, lending weight to the idea that 
flavour, rather than retronasal olfaction, should be considered a first-class sense-
modality (Small, Voss, Mak, Simmons, Parrish and Gitelman 2004, p. 1896). However, 
given the degree of overlap between orthonasal and retronasal olfaction, this would 
potentially lead to both being considered sub-modalities of flavour rather than 
olfaction. While this might make sense for retronasal olfaction given its close 
connection with gustation, classing orthonasal olfaction as a form of flavour experience 
seems bizarre, not to mention the difficulty of explaining similar interactions with 
touch, audition and vision (cf. Smith 2015, p. 340).
Without further precisification or additional criteria, then, the sense-organ criterion 
alone cannot decide between (A), Rtype, and Rtoken. At this point, one might be tempted 
to choose whichever version of the criterion best accords with our pre-theoretical 
intuitions about taste, smell and flavour (whatever those might be). However, we 
should be wary of this approach. Part of the reason for adopting individuation criteria 
is to help adjudicate difficult cases, such as olfaction. Adjusting the criteria to fit our 
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preconceptions would therefore undermine the reason for adopting them in the first 
place. Alternatively, we might appeal to some principled, non-arbitrary way of 
determining how to individuate sense-organs; e.g. in biology and the natural sciences. 
However, the question of whether to adopt a coarse- or fine-grained individuation 
account of sense-organs cannot be settled by appealing to scientific evidence alone 
since the same question will arise in relation to the interpretation of that evidence, and 
so the problem recurs. This presents us with an apparent dilemma: do we (1) accept the 
verdict of the sciences in individuating sense-organs, ignoring any potentially 
conflicting phenomenological evidence, or (2) adopt some further, or different, criteria? 
Given the existence of other difficult cases, such as those described in §2.1, we might 
well agree with Grice that the sense-organ criterion alone is insufficient for the 
individuation of modality-types. An appeal to further criteria, such as phenomenal 
character, therefore seems warranted.
3.1.3.Phenomenal Character
Olfactory quality space is, by most accounts, orders of magnitude larger than, for 
example, colour space, which is typically characterised as having just three 
dimensions.  Moreover, the distinction between simple (i.e. mono-molecular) and 18
complex (i.e. compound) odours is notoriously hard to discern introspectively, with 
exposure to even a single substance yielding stimulation of dozens, or even hundreds, 
of receptor types — coffee being a case in point (Smith 2015, p. 343). Given our ability to 
differentiate between orthonasal and retronasal olfactory experiences, however, it is 
clear that there must be some difference in their respective phenomenal character. 
Indeed, one might intuitively expect there to be a substantive difference due to the 
latter’s role in flavour perception. Rozin, for example, claims that “the same olfactory 
 For discussion of how quality space theory relates to olfaction, see Young, Keller and 18
Rosenthal (2014). For colour space, see Hardin (1988).
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stimulus seems qualitatively different when referred to the mouth or the outside 
world” (Rozin 1982, p.  397) and that “[i]t seems very likely that the olfactory 
component of flavor differs markedly from the olfactory consequences of the same 
substance in the external world” (ibid., p. 400). Smith concurs, stating that “[t]he cases 
… involving cheese, coffee, and chocolate show how orthonasally and retronasally 
presented odour stimuli lead to different experiential effects” (2015, p.  328). What 
evidence is there for these claims, and are the resulting differences in phenomenal 
character sufficient to warrant a distinction in modality-type?
In addressing these questions, anecdotal examples include, once again, coffee, 
which smells rich and delicious, but can taste somewhat watery or disappointing by 
comparison, and cheeses that have an off-putting smell, but taste delicious in the 
mouth (Rozin 1982, p. 397; Auvray and Spence 2008, p. 1023; Smith 2015, p. 327). The 
existence of such cases would seem to support the kind of marked phenomenal 
difference that Rozin predicts. However, despite their intuitive appeal, such cases do 
not settle the matter since they involve comparing an orthonasal olfactory experience, 
e.g. the smell of coffee or strong cheese, with a multisensory flavour experience of the 
same object. This shows that, in combination with gustatory and/or somatosensory 
stimulation, retronasal olfaction can yield an experience whose phenomenal character 
and/or hedonic value can be quite different to an orthonasal olfactory experience of 
the same odour source. But this falls short of what needs to be demonstrated, since the 
olfactory component of flavour experiences is not readily dissociable from gustatory 
and other sensory components via introspection, meaning that any difference may be 
entirely due to the contribution of gustation and/or other modalities. Hence these 
examples fail to compare like with like.
To convincingly demonstrate a difference between the phenomenal character (or 
content) of orthonasal and retronasal olfactory experiences of the same substance one 
would need to hold the non-olfactory components of the experience constant, 
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preferably by eliminating them altogether. Only then would any resulting difference in 
phenomenal character be attributable to the variation in olfactory pathway alone. 
When such experiments are conducted under controlled circumstances (Heilmann and 
Hummel 2004; Small, Gerber, Mak and Hummel 2005), the only differences that have 
yet been found concern the odour’s perceived intensity and location. Moreover, these 
effects vary between odourants and “may be dependent upon whether an odor has 
been previously experienced retronasally (i.e., whether it is a food odor)” (ibid., p. 599), 
as is consistent with retronasal olfaction’s role in flavour perception. Notably, the only 
food odour tested in this study was chocolate, which showed no difference in 
phenomenal character apart from perceived location due to oral referral, with non-food 
odorants exhibiting differences in both intensity and location.  Though any difference 19
in phenomenal character is sufficient to demonstrate a degree of differentiation, this 
falls short of the kind of marked difference in character that Rozin et al. predict, and 
that is suggested by the anecdotal examples of cheese or coffee.
Even if more dramatic differences were found, however, one would need to rule 
out two possible confounds. First, as previously noted, odorants can undergo physical 
changes in the mouth or throat prior to detection at the olfactory epithelium. Some of 
these may affect the phenomenal character of the resulting experience. This possibility 
thus needs to be eliminated or controlled for, as in the above studies, in order to 
attribute the resulting difference to the olfactory pathway, as opposed to physical 
differences in proximal stimuli at the point of detection. Second, different 
concentrations of the same odorant can seem qualitatively distinct in a way that goes 
beyond apparent differences in intensity (Moskowitz, Dravnieks and Klarman 1976). If 
the resulting variation in phenomenal character is found at different intensity levels in 
both olfactory pathways, this would seem insufficient to warrant a distinction in 
 See §§3.2.1–2 for discussion.19
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modality-type since the difference is potentially attributable to variation in intensity 
alone.  In the absence of more dramatic cases, then, it remains at best unclear whether 20
we can individuate orthonasal and retronasal olfaction by means of phenomenal 
character, except perhaps for differences in perceived location and/or intensity (see 
§3.2).
3.1.4.Representational Content
As noted above, the content of olfactory experience may depend upon the metaphysics 
of perception (representationalism, relationalism, etc.), its phenomenal character 
(according to intentionalism), and/or the proximal or distal objects of olfaction. Since 
each of these issues is contentious in its own right, I bracket discussion of this criterion 
other than to note that, as a consequence of these dependencies, the criterion is 
susceptible to the same problems and ambiguities that I discuss above.
3.2. Token-Individuation Criteria
I turn now to evaluating the token-individuation criteria set out in §2.2 with respect to 
olfaction, starting with the question of whether the phenomenal character of orthonasal 
and retronasal olfactory experiences can be considered continuous with, or distinct 
from, one another.
3.2.1.Spatial Continuity
As noted above, odorants  —  or olfactory sensations, depending upon how one 
characterises olfactory experience —  are perceived as located in or around the nose, 
mouth or throat, depending on the presence or absence of oral referral (§3). However, 
there remain significant unknowns concerning the precise physiological mechanisms 
that govern this. Many of the possibilities, including the presence of tactile sensations 
 Small, Gerber, Mak and Hummel (2005, p. 599) also highlight perceived intensity as confound 20
in relation to brain imaging studies.
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in the mouth or throat, detection of airflow in the nasal cavity, and trigeminal cueing 
have been ruled out experimentally (Small, Gerber, Mak and Hummel 2005, p. 594). 
Instead, this appears to depend upon a variety of factors that jointly determine the type 
and/or degree of oral referral experienced. These include:
(a) the presence or absence of gustatory stimulation
(b) whether gustatory and olfactory stimuli are congruent or incongruent with 
one another
(c) whether or not the stimulus is a foodstuff
(d) the relative timing of gustatory and olfactory stimuli
(e) whether olfactory and gustatory stimulation are attributed to the same source 
object, and
(f) the precise pattern of stimulation of the olfactory epithelium (cf. Heilmann 
and Hummel 2004, p. 417).
If these cues are disrupted, for example by presenting a incongruent gustatory 
stimulus, or one that occurs significantly before or after the corresponding olfactory 
stimulus, the odorant will typically be perceived as located in the nose or back of the 
throat even when presented retronasally (Lim and Johnson 2012).
Of particular significance for the evaluation of spatial continuity, odorants may be 
experienced as located at different points in the mouth or throat (Lim and Johnson 
2011). This suggests that oral referral may not be an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a 
matter of degree. Thus, either the range of experienced locations (i)  is divisible into 
discrete orthonasal and retronasal regions with a distinct boundary, or step-change, 
between the two, or (ii) forms a smooth continuum. According to the spatial continuity 
criterion, the first scenario would favour Rtoken (or possibly Rtype, depending upon other 
variations in phenomenal character discussed below), while the second favours a 
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single-token view. Current experimental data is inconclusive as to which of these 
possibilities is correct, but the question is, at least in principle, answerable through 
further empirical research.
3.2.2.Phenomenal Continuity
A further difference between the phenomenal character of orthonasal and retronasal 
olfactory experience concerns its perceived intensity. Specifically, orthonasal detection 
of an odorant typically results in a higher intensity olfactory experience than retronasal 
detection of the same odorant, particularly for food odours. This is true even when the 
concentration of the odour source is held constant (Diaz 2004). One might hypothesise 
that this is due to differing quantities of the odorant reaching the olfactory epithelium 
because of absorption and transmission effects within the orthonasal and retronasal 
pathways. In an ingenious experiment, however, Heilmann and Hummel (2004) 
controlled for this possibility by sampling the concentration of odorant within the nasal 
cavity itself, using the resulting measurement to adjust the amount of odorant 
delivered. Surprisingly, they found that orthonasal delivery results in a more intense 
olfactory experience than retronasal delivery even when the same concentration of 
odorant is present in the nasal cavity.21
Combined with the phenomenon of oral referral, Heilmann and Hummel’s 
findings might be taken to show that orthonasal and retronasal olfaction are 
phenomenally distinct after all. Variations in perceived location and intensity are, 
however, consistent with the kind of changes in phenomenal character and/or 
representational content found in other sense-modalities, such as vision and hearing. 
Indeed, this might be taken to constitute a form of distance constancy effect.  22
Retronasal odorants, being located within the body, typically result in a larger quantity 
 Though not for all odorants. Cf. Small, Gerber, Mak and Hummel (2005, p. 597, 600).21
 A possibility suggested to me by Charles Spence.22
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of odorant reaching the olfactory epithelium during eating or drinking than would be 
the case for the same concentration of odorant delivered orthonasally. The olfactory 
system then compensates for this by adjusting the perceived intensity of retronasal and 
orthonasal olfactory experience to better approximate the distal, rather than proximal, 
concentration. The existence of such a constancy effect would, according to Burge 
(2010), render olfaction a fully-fledged perceptual modality rather than, as Burge 
himself claims, a mere stimulus–response mechanism (cf. §4.1). In any case, while such 
variations give grounds for thinking there is some difference in phenomenal character 
between olfactory pathways, it is not of the dramatic kind that Rozin et al. suggest. 
Rather, such differences may, by comparison with other sense-modalities, arguably be 
accommodated within a single type or token modality.
Notwithstanding the anecdotal cases discussed in §3.1.3, which compare unimodal 
olfactory and multimodal flavour experiences, orthonasal and retronasal olfaction 
might also intuitively be thought to share the same quality space (cf. Young, Keller and 
Rosenthal 2014). Moreover, retronasal quality space is also potentially continuous with, 
or a subset of, flavour quality space. This might be taken to support the idea that the 
chemical senses form a single unified token-modality as opposed to being divided into 
distinct taste, smell, trigeminal, and/or flavour modalities. To establish this 
conclusively, however, would require a substantive body of psychophysical evidence. 
If, on the other hand, orthonasal olfaction and flavour count as distinct modality-types 
on the basis of some other criterion, such as proximal stimuli, this might motivate 
treating retronasal olfaction as a component of flavour perception as opposed to being 
purely olfactory (cf §3.1.2).
The phenomenal and spatial continuity criteria raise the question of precisely how 
much variation in phenomenal character is required to constitute a distinct type or 
token modality. The spatial continuity criterion suggests one possible answer: token 
modalities are distinct when there is a spatial discontinuity between them — a matter 
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which is, in principle at least, empirically verifiable. The phenomenal continuity 
criterion suggests another: token modalities reflect discontinuities in quality space. 
While these two criteria are not exhaustive and may be combined in various ways, 
without some principled reason to prefer one over the other, the problem of how best 
to apply them remains. Indeed, this is just the phenomenological analogue of the 
problem that dogged the sense-organ criterion concerning how to choose an 
appropriate precisification without making question-begging or ad hoc assumptions 
about the ‘correct’ modality types. Without further precisification, however, the present 
criteria are not decisive in the case of olfaction, at least with our current level of 
empirical knowledge.
3.2.3.Counterfactual Dependency
The counterfactual dependency and intersubstitutability criteria concern what happens 
to one putative token modality (e.g. orthonasal olfaction) in the event of the loss or 
impairment of another (e.g. retronasal olfaction). Smith (2015, pp. 329–30) cites three 
kinds of dissociation that can occur between orthonasal and retronasal olfaction in 
pathological cases. The most obvious involves the disruption or blockage of the 
airways; e.g. due to nasal polyps (Landis, Hummel, Hugentobler, Giger and Lacroix 
2003). This is analogous to blocking light from entering one eye, or sound from 
entering one ear, which would not normally be taken to show that we have two token 
senses of vision or hearing. By parity of reasoning, we should not rest too much weight 
upon such cases in olfaction since they concern the purely mechanical aspects of 
odorant transmission, rather than the functioning of the sensory organ per se 
(depending upon how such organs are individuated; cf. §3.1.2). Smith’s third example, 
however, suggests that damage to one olfactory pathway can cause a sensory deficit 
that does not affect the other pathway. Unlike damage to one eye, which affects the 
phenomenal character of the resulting visual experiences due to the loss of depth 
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information, this suggests that the functioning of one olfactory pathway can be 
impaired without affecting the phenomenal character arising from the other. According 
to the counterfactual dependency criterion, this favours Rtoken over (A).
3.2.4. Intersubstitutability
On first approximation, it does not appear to be possible to substitute orthonasal for 
retronasal olfaction due to the obvious physiological difficulties involved. Indeed, the 
two pathways seem to have quite different functions: one samples odours in the 
surrounding environment, the other works in conjunction with gustation to create 
flavour perception. The core contribution of olfaction, however — namely, identifying a 
kind of stuff (cf. Mizrahi 2013) — remains common to both, despite a difference in target 
objects. Moreover, since the exact mechanism for disambiguating the two pathways is 
not fully understood, it remains an open question whether one could with suitable ‘re-
plumbing’, e.g. via a prosthetic device, induce orthonasal olfaction while eating or 
drinking, and retronasal olfaction when sampling the external environment. If it were 
possible to retrain the use of one’s olfactory pathways in this way, then there would be 
no principled reason why orthonasal or retronasal olfaction could not compensate for 
the loss or impairment of the other, despite the considerable practical barriers to doing 
so, thus favouring (A) over Rtoken.
3.3. Summary
The type-individuation criteria for proximal stimulus (I) and potentially phenomenal 
character (III) would seem to favour the traditional view of olfaction as a single type-
modality, i.e. (A). Crucially, however, it is unclear whether differences in the perceived 
location and intensity of orthonasal and retronasal olfactory stimuli are sufficient to 
ground a difference in modality type and/or token. The Aristotelian view receives 
further support from the consideration of spatial and phenomenal continuity, as per 
token-individuation criteria (i) and (ii), though the details are controversial and in need 
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of further empirical support. The sense-organ (II) and representational content (IV) 
criteria, however, fail to deliver any clear verdict, at least without further 
precisification. Counterfactual dependency (i) and possibly intersubstitutability (ii), on 
the other hand, seem to speak in favour of Rtoken on the basis that orthonasal and 
retronasal olfaction are at least somewhat independent, though again the details are 
debatable and require additional empirical support.
What conclusion we take from these conflicting results depends upon which 
criteria, and crucially which precisifications of the criteria, we take to be important for 
type- and/or token-individuation of sense-modalities. One way of answering the 
individuation questions for olfaction would therefore be to pick a criterion, or set of 
criteria, and stick with it. This approach, however, requires a degree of selectivity about 
the evidence, along with a certain arbitrariness about what counts as a sufficient 
difference in, for example, phenomenal character in order to constitute a separate type 
or token modality  —  issues that are not settled by the choice of criteria alone. 
Alternatively, one could select whichever precisifications of the relevant criteria deliver 
a clear verdict in the case of olfaction. However, as previously noted, to avoid the 
charge that such a method is question-begging or ad hoc, the selection and 
precisification of criteria must be done in a principled manner that is both 
independently justifiable and successfully generalises to other sense-modalities. Given 
the difficulty of these tasks, this scarcely leaves us any further forward. To the contrary, 
the standard type-individuation and proposed token-individuation criteria either fail 
to offer a definitive result in the case of olfaction, or else deliver conflicting results with 
no obvious way of resolving the conflict. If so, then so much the worse for these 
criteria.
The original puzzle thus remains. Do orthonasal and retronasal olfaction constitute 
one sense or two, and how exactly are we to decide this? In the following section, I 
sketch an alternative approach which suggests that the answer lies in an ambiguity in 
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the question concerning the meaning of the term ‘sense’. By identifying two distinct, 
but complementary, notions of a sense-modality, the resulting ‘dual-concept’ 
framework provides an alternative to both traditional and contemporary approaches, 
thereby helping to articulate and clarify the relationships between the senses.
4. The Dual-Concept Framework
The alleged duality of olfaction illustrates a tension between (a) providing a purely 
physiological account of sensory systems; e.g. olfaction, gustation, trigeminal, and (b) 
classifying the resulting forms of perceptual experience; e.g. ‘taste’ (aka flavour) and 
smell. Indeed, the traditional type-individuation criteria may themselves be divided 
into distinct groupings along physiological and experiential lines. Instead of shoe-
horning all these and other criteria into a single one-size-fits-all model, or adopting a 
purely pragmatic or contextualist approach, we can instead choose to recognise this 
distinction in the way that the notion of a sense-modality is employed. Though it has 
received relatively little attention in the philosophical literature,  such a response to 23
the problem of sensory individuation can be found in the work of J.  J. Gibson (1966, 
1979).24
In this section, I present and evaluate a version of what I will call the dual-concept 
framework for sensory individuation (§4.1), with particular reference to the case of 
olfaction (§4.2). I conclude by defending the view against objections, including 
comparisons with contemporary pluralistic accounts (§4.3).
 Matthen (2015) being a notable exception.23
 I do not claim here to present a faithful or comprehensive account of Gibson’s view. Rather, 24
the proposed framework employs some of Gibson’s key insights into the nature of sensory 
systems while remaining neutral on other aspects of his ecological theory of perception; e.g. 
affordance perception.
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4.1. Sensory Channels vs. Experiential Modalities
Gibson makes two distinctive claims about sensory individuation. The first is that there 
is not only one, but two distinct conceptions of a sense-modality as follows:
(1) A sensory channel, or physiological mechanism for detecting and extracting 
certain types of information from environmental stimuli: light, sound, 
chemical properties, etc.
(2) An experiential modality, which relates to a distinctive form of experience that 
enables an organism to make certain kinds of perceptual discriminations and 
perform related tasks.25
The second, and perhaps more surprising, claim is that these two conceptions are not 
competing notions of what constitutes a sense-modality, but rather mutually 
complementary components of an overarching account of human sensory architecture. 
Thus, according to Gibson, it is not a question of which of (1) and (2) is the correct or 
predominant use of the term ‘sense’ or ‘sense-modality’. Rather, both conceptions have 
equal prominence, and indeed are closely interrelated.
This duality of concepts is less obvious in the case of vision, hearing and touch, 
where the two notions appear to be closely aligned (though not precisely if one takes 
the role of bodily orientation into account). In the case of taste, smell and various forms 
of bodily awareness, however, the appearance of a one-to-one correspondence breaks 
down and we instead require a many-to-many mapping between sensory channels — 
olfaction, gustation, trigeminal, somatosensation, and so on — on the one hand, and 
experiential modalities: taste, smell, touch, etc., on the other. Rather than attempting to 
combine both conceptions into a single unitary calculus, as on traditional philosophical 
 Gibson (1966) calls these “sensory” and “perceptual” systems, respectively. However, this 25
terminology is potentially confusing given the wide and varied use of these terms in 
philosophy, and so I adopt the more neutral terms above.
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approaches, the dual-concept framework emphases their distinctness. To the extent 
that our everyday concept of a ‘sense’ tracks either of these notions, it is ambiguous 
between a sensory channel and an experiential modality. This in turn renders the 
question of whether we have one or two ‘senses’ of smell ambiguous between:
Physiological question (CHANNEL): Do humans have one or two distinct olfactory 
sensory channels?
Experiential question (EXPERIENCE): Do humans have one or two distinct forms of 
olfactory experience?
CHANNEL relates primarily to physiological and mechanistic considerations, 
encompassing (though not limited to) the traditional proximal stimulus and sense-
organ criteria. EXPERIENCE, on the other hand, relates primarily to the psychology and 
phenomenology of perception, encompassing (though not limited to) the traditional 
phenomenal character and representational content criteria.  Token-individuation 26
criteria (i) and (ii), which concern aspects of phenomenal character, are subsumed 
under the latter, whereas (iii) and (iv) relate to functional considerations that cross-cut 
the physiological/experiential distinction.
Central to the Gibsonian picture is the idea that sense-modalities of each kind can 
be mapped onto one another to explain how the relevant sensory channels contribute 
to the formation of experience. In some cases, this may be a straightforward one-to-one 
mapping. The prevalence of cross-modal effects, however, raises doubts as to whether 
even supposedly paradigm cases of ‘unimodal’ perception, such as seeing, are limited 
to a single sensory channel, i.e. vision, or whether other channels such as 
 Here I depart somewhat from Gibson, who regarded “modes of activity”, and in particular 26
attention, to be central to the individuation of experiential modalities (1966, p. 49). However, 
one need not subscribe to this aspect of Gibson’s view in order to endorse the dual-concept 
framework.
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equilibrioception and proprioception also play a role (cf. Briscoe 2019, p.  18). In the 
case of olfaction, however, the relevant sensory channel (or channels) may contribute 
to, and indeed transform, perceptual experience in more than one modality; e.g. smell 
and ‘taste’ as standardly understood, i.e. flavour perception. The distinction between 
unimodal and multimodal experience can thus be drawn in terms of whether a given 
experiential modality, e.g. touch or smell, constitutively depends upon the activity of 
one or more sensory channels; e.g. temperature, pressure, olfaction. Thus, considered 
as an experiential modality, flavour perception is inherently multimodal since it 
involves the activity of multiple sensory channels.
Furthermore, the framework enables a clear distinction to be drawn between 
unisensory (e.g. auditory) and multisensory (e.g. audiovisual) experiences that result 
from the activity of two or more experiential modalities. The McGurk effect (McGurk 
and MacDonald 1977), for example, involves a multisensory experience of auditory 
and visual stimuli, though subjects can be mistaken about which aspects of the 
resulting phenomenology are due to which sensory channel due to the presence of 
cross-modal interactions. It is to the dual-concept framework’s credit that it enables 
these kinds of theoretical distinctions to be drawn in a relatively natural and 
straightforward way. The same cannot be said for the rival pluralistic approaches 
discussed below, where the application of one or more of individuation criteria results 
in a logically coherent, but otherwise unwieldy profusion of classifications that are not 
necessarily helpful in explicating the nature of perceptual processing or experience 
(§4.3).
Returning to the case of olfaction, then, odorants proceed through the orthonasal 
or retronasal pathway  —  a physiological distinction  —  to the olfactory epithelium, 
where information is extracted concerning the presence or absence of various physical 
properties. This sensory channel (or channels) can give rise to two different forms of 
perceptual experience: (i) a smell experience, typically as a result of activity in the 
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orthonasal pathway, possibly in conjunction with the trigeminal channel; or (ii) a 
flavour experience, typically corresponding to activity in the retronasal pathway 
alongside gustatory, somatosensory, trigeminal, and other channels (Spence, Auvray 
and Smith 2014). Thus, as noted by Smith (2015, p.  330), both smell and flavour 
experiences are, strictly speaking, multimodal since each may include a trigeminal 
component  —  and much more besides in the case of flavour experience, which is 
multisensory in the sense defined above.
Philosophical debate over whether flavour is a first-class sense-modality or a 
combination of unisensory experiences can now be seen to rest upon the ambiguity 
between the sensory channel of gustation, i.e. ‘taste’ in the strict scientific sense, and the 
experiential modality of flavour, i.e. ‘taste’ in the everyday sense. Thus, contrary to 
Rozin (1982) and Spence, Auvray and Smith (2014), we need not attribute any mistake 
to the folk in using ‘taste’ to include both gustation and retronasal olfaction, since by 
this they do not mean the sensory channel of gustation, but the experiential modality to 
which both the gustatory and olfactory channels contribute. Similarly, ‘smell’ need not 
be taken to be exhaustive of the contribution of olfaction to experience, some of which 
is more readily attributable to ‘taste’, aka flavour perception. Our ordinary language 
concerning smell, taste and/or flavour perception thus remains in good order.
To avoid such terminological disputes, philosophers would do well to adopt the 
scientific terms  —  olfaction, gustation, vision, audition, somatosensation, 
proprioception, equilibrioception, etc. —  to refer to sensory channels, whilst reserving 
the more familiar everyday terms  —  taste, smell, sight, hearing, touch, etc.  —  for 
experiential modalities.  In conjunction with the dual-concept framework, this enables 27
questions concerning inter-modal binding and cross-modal effects to be formulated 
more precisely while highlighting that our understanding of both domains is capable 
 I do not mean to suggest that common usage of these terms is exclusively employed in these 27
ways; manifestly, it is not.
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of revision in light of the empirical evidence (§4.3). Indeed, much of the confusion and 
disagreement within the philosophical literature on these issues can be diagnosed as 
being due to the conflation of these two distinct, but complementary, conceptions of a 
sense-modality, and the — in Gibson’s view, misguided — attempt to combine them into 
a single unitary concept.
4.2. Olfactory Types and Occurrences
In order to make progress with the physiological and experiential questions, we need 
to answer these in a way that allows not only type-, but token-individuation of sensory 
channels and experiential modalities. As we have seen, the individuation of olfactory 
sensory channels depends upon physiological facts about sense-organs and the 
proximal stimuli for olfaction. For an organism to have multiple such channels of the 
same type would therefore require the existence of multiple physiological mechanisms 
for detecting olfactory proximal stimuli that employ the same method of information 
uptake. As with the individuation of sense-organs, this is an empirical question that is 
best answered by biological and evolutionary science. I will therefore refrain from 
taking a firm stance on this here other than to note that the orthonasal and retronasal 
pathways seem at least plausible candidates for sensory channels, albeit ones whose 
physical realisations substantially overlap. Thus a version of Rtoken remains a viable 
view of olfactory sensory channels.
The individuation of experiential modalities, on the other hand, belongs primarily 
to the domain of philosophy and psychology. According to the dual-concept 
framework, the types of olfactory experience that occur in humans is determined by 
the phenomenology and psychophysics of olfaction. Here it is more difficult to 
understand what could constitute multiple occurrences of the same experiential 
modality type, since if the phenomenal characters of two experiences were wholly 
indistinguishable, we might naturally conclude that they are necessarily experiences of 
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the same type. This, along with the alleged ambiguity of our everyday use of the word 
‘sense’, perhaps explains the seeming uncanniness of the token-individuation question 
in relation to experiential modalities noted in §2.2. However, multiple tokens of 
experiential modalities are nevertheless possible where these differ along one or more 
dimensions, or are capable of occurring simultaneously. Two token visual senses 
differentiated only by their spatial content, but which are otherwise 
phenomenologically indistinguishable, would constitute such a case. Other criteria, 
such as those listed in §2, then come into play in determining whether such an 
arrangement constitutes multiple occurrences of a single (e.g. visual) type, or multiple 
types, as seems more plausible in the case of the spookfish and Grice’s Martian.
If we restrict ourselves to purely olfactory experience, however, there appears to be 
relatively little difference in the phenomenology of orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. 
As noted above (3.1.3, 3.2.1–2), those differences in perceived location and intensity 
that do exist can readily be accommodated within a single experiential modality, as is 
uncontroversially the case for vision, audition, and touch. Moreover, as both Rozin and 
Smith point out, despite — or perhaps because of — retronasal olfaction’s role in flavour 
perception, it often goes unnoticed as a distinctive form of olfactory experience. This 
suggests that that the relevant experiential distinction is not between orthonasal and 
retronasal olfaction per  se, but between orthonasal ‘smell’ and multimodal flavour 
experience, i.e. ‘taste’. While the latter includes a substantial contribution from 
retronasal olfaction, it is not one that can be readily isolated via introspection. This 
does, however, help to explain the felt similarity between certain odours and flavours, 
since both share a common olfactory component and overlapping quality space (cf. 
Smith 2015, p.  339). A version of Rtype therefore seems the correct view of olfactory 
experience, which includes flavour, independently of the individuation of olfactory 
sensory channels.
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Depending on the empirical evidence, then, there are either one or two olfactory 
sensory channels which, along with trigeminal and other sensory channels, give rise to 
both smell and flavour experiences. This yields the partial taxonomy of the chemical 
senses illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1, which shows the mapping between the 
two kinds of ‘senses’ posited by the dual-concept framework. (The asterisk indicates 
that the relevant token modalities may or may not be identical, with ellipses indicating 
other sense-modalities.) Furthermore, both smell and flavour, aka ‘taste’, form part of 
more complex multisensory experiences involving visual, auditory, tactual, and/or 
other experiential components. Indeed, it remains an open question whether there are 
any truly unisensory experiences, or whether all perceptual experiences are effectively 
multisensory. Both possibilities, however, can readily be accommodated within the 
Gibsonian framework.
4.3. Objections
In this section I consider three objections to the dual-concept view of sensory 
individuation set out above, and compare it to contemporary pluralist and fine-grained 
approaches.
The first objection is that dual-concept framework simply leaves the problem of 
how to individuate olfactory and other modalities untouched. Indeed, it replaces it 
with two such problems concerning the individuation of sensory channels and 
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Sensory channels Experiential modalities
⎡ Olfactionortho ⎫
⎢ ⎬–– Smell  ⎫
    * ⎢ Trigeminal   ⎫ ⎭  ⎪
⎢   ⎪  ⎪⎣ Olfactionretro   ⎬––––– Flavour (‘Taste’)  ⎬––  Multisensory experience 
  ⎪  ⎪
Gustation   ⎭  ⎪
 ⎪
… …  ⎭
Figure. 1
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experiential modalities, respectively. Since each of these ultimately requires the use of 
individuation criteria such those listed in §2, it suffers from the same difficulties in 
selecting and precisifying those criteria as more traditional views, and so the problem 
remains.
In response to this worry I would point out three things. First, by subdividing the 
problem of how to individuate sensory modalities into what are arguably two more 
manageable issues, the dual-concept framework makes a significant contribution 
towards articulating a comprehensive and scientifically accurate account of human 
sensory systems. While this does not resolve all the issues surrounding sensory 
individuation, including the precisification of various criteria, it offers a simple and 
effective conceptual framework within which questions about multisensory processing 
and experience can more accurately be formulated and addressed, and so represents 
genuine progress on these issues. Second, by providing a principled reason to divide 
the available criteria along physiological and experiential lines, the dual-concept 
framework answers the question of what happens when these criteria pull in different 
directions, as in the case of olfaction. This in turn clarifies both which criteria and what 
kinds of evidence are relevant to each form of sense-modality, thus resolving a 
potential source of problems for multi-criteria approaches. Third, the dual-concept 
framework diagnoses the historical disagreement between and among philosophers 
and scientists on this issue as being due to a failure to recognise two distinct, but 
mutually complementary, notions of a sense-modality in favour of pursuing a unitary 
single-concept account. As such, it offers a novel, but powerful, response to the 
individuation problem, albeit one whose details require further explication.
The second objection concerns the alleged ambiguity of our everyday concept of a 
sense. Why should we think that there are two, and only two, such notions? Though 
the merits of the dual-concept framework are largely independent of claims about 
ordinary language usage, it is not unusual for folk-psychological concepts to be 
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ambiguous. Indeed, some relevance theorists argue that all substantive linguistic terms 
are polysemous, and so have multiple meanings (Carston 2012). It should therefore not 
be surprising that our everyday concept of a ‘sense’ fails to precisely track the 
philosophical distinction between sense-modalities, or either of the conceptions that 
Gibson identifies. Nevertheless, disagreement in the philosophical and scientific 
literature attests to the controversial nature of this concept, as well as to a certain 
duality in its application. It is natural, for example, to move from talking of experiential 
to physiological ‘senses’ when it is pointed out that much of the flavour of food comes 
from ‘smell’ (i.e. the retronasal olfactory channel) and not ‘taste’ (i.e. the gustatory 
channel). Yet we also say that we savour food by tasting it (in the experiential sense), 
since English has no equivalent verb for flavour. Precedent can therefore be found for 
both of the Gibsonian conceptions in ordinary usage.
It is important, however, to differentiate the dual-concept framework from the idea 
that there are rival folk-psychological and scientific concepts of a sense. Call this the 
folk/expert view. Rather, what is novel about Gibson’s view is that neither of the two 
conceptions he posits has explanatory priority. In contrast to the folk/expert view, 
along with various forms of non-naturalism according to which the referents of the 
senses depend, if they refer at all, upon our linguistic conventions (Nudds 2011; 
Richardson 2013) or pragmatic considerations (see below), the dual-concept framework 
emphasises that both conceptions are required in order to give a full account of human 
sensory systems. Consequently, pace Richardson (op. cit.), both folk and scientific usage 
can be wrong about, for example, the individuation of taste or smell, and so liable to 
revision in light of empirical evidence.
The final objection concerns whether the proposed view is genuinely distinct from 
pluralist accounts according to which there is no single privileged way of 
individuating the senses, but rather a multitude of possible ways. Fulkerson (2014a), 
for example, advocates a form of pragmatism in which sense-modalities are relativised 
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to some explanatory project or theoretical goal, and so not mind-independent natural 
kinds. Psychologists and biologists, for example, typically employ different 
individuation criteria to the layperson and each other, according to their explanatory 
and communicative interests. As such, philosophers who agree upon all the physical 
and experiential facts, but disagree about whether there are, for example, one or two 
olfactory senses, are simply talking past each other. Fulkerson’s view thus amounts to a 
form of contextualism about the concept of a sense-modality according to which there is, 
strictly speaking, no fact of the matter about which notion of a sense is the correct one. 
Instead, theorists simply appeal to whichever notion is most the useful or relevant for 
their specific purpose.
A different form of pluralism is advocated by Macpherson (2011, 2015), who 
argues that instead of choosing some specific criterion or set of criteria, we should 
combine all the available criteria to construct a complex multidimensional space of 
possible modality-types. This abstract space is then reduced to the minimum number 
of dimensions required to capture the relevant distinctions using principal component 
analysis — a statistical technique that eliminates redundant information. Each possible 
and actual sense-modality type is then identified with the corresponding subregion of 
the resulting multidimensional space, with coarse- and fine-grained modality types 
occupying overlapping regions. While it is unclear whether Macpherson thinks we 
have multiple concepts of a sense, as per Fulkerson, or a single highly flexible concept,  28
in contrast to the dual-concept framework, her approach aims to incorporate a plurality 
of individuation criteria within a unitary account of modality types.
While a dual-concept approach can to some extent be accommodated by each of 
these forms of perceptual pluralism (to use Fulkerson’s term), there remain several 
important distinctions. While pluralism doesn’t preclude certain methods of 
 Some of Macpherson’s remarks, e.g. Macpherson (2011, p. 22), seem to suggest the latter.28
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individuation being more useful or important than others —  in scientific explanation, 
for example —  it does not accord any special status to the Gibsonian conceptions of a 
sensory channel or experiential modality. Similarly, on Macpherson’s account, this 
distinction cross-cuts the space of possible modality types, since each relates to a subset 
of the traditional individuation criteria. Nor does pluralism help to explain why both 
of these conceptions are essential components of a comprehensive theory of human 
sensory systems. Indeed, by combining the Gibsonian notions into a single calculus, 
pluralism arguably only serves to obscure this crucial distinction, which does not 
emerge naturally from either account, even if it can be retrofitted in an ad hoc or 
contrived manner.
Finally, both forms of pluralism focus only upon type-individuation and are silent 
on token-individuation. Though Macpherson is undoubtedly sensitive to both, her 
view does not readily apply to the latter, and so fails to explain the essential 
interdependence of these two questions. In contrast, by dividing the available criteria 
into distinct physiological and experiential domains, the dual-concept framework 
makes it intelligible both (a) how each domain can admit of multiple ‘tokens’, or 
occurrences, and (b) how the relevant type- and token-individuation criteria are 
connected. While one can always devise finer-grained taxonomies that may have a 
certain theoretical interest, all other things being equal we should aim for the simplest 
explanation any given phenomenon. By highlighting the distinction and relationship 
between two very different conceptions of a sense-modality, the dual-concept approach 
manages to combine a low degree of complexity with a high degree of explanatory 
power. As such, it represents an advance upon both pluralism and the traditional kinds 
of responses to the individuation problem that have dominated philosophical thinking 
on this topic since antiquity.
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5. Conclusion
I have argued that the question of whether orthonasal and retronasal olfaction 
constitute one or two distinct ‘senses’ is ambiguous between the existence of distinct 
sensory channels  —  an issue that turns upon empirical evidence concerning the 
physiological and neurological mechanisms employed during orthonasal and 
retronasal olfaction — and distinct experiential modalities, an issue that depends upon the 
phenomenal character and/or representational content of olfactory experience. While 
current empirical evidence is inconclusive on the former, reflection upon the 
phenomenology of olfaction suggests that humans have one experiential modality 
dedicated to smell, this consisting of orthonasal olfaction plus the trigeminal sensory 
channel, in addition to a multimodal flavour modality, commonly known as ‘taste’, to 
which retronasal olfaction makes a significant contribution.
If this view of sensory individuation is correct, then the duality of olfaction is not 
between distinct olfactory senses, but two different conceptions of a sense-modality. As 
Gibson recognised, the resulting conceptions should not be understood as offering 
competing views of sensory individuation, but as mutually complementary elements 
of an overarching account of human sensory architecture  —  a comprehensive 
explanation of which requires both. This requires splitting our naïve and somewhat 
confused pre-theoretical conception of a ‘sense’ into two distinct concepts 
corresponding to the Gibsonian notions of a sensory channel and experiential modality, 
respectively. The resulting ‘dual-concept’ framework thus offers a novel and powerful 
response to the problem of individuating the senses that helps to clarify both the nature 
of olfaction and articulate the relation between the physiology and phenomenology of 
sensory experience more generally.
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